diff --git a/crates/fido-common/Cargo.toml b/crates/fido-common/Cargo.toml new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3beb7b9 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/fido-common/Cargo.toml @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +[package] +name = "fido-common" +version = "0.1.0" +edition = "2021" + +# See more keys and their definitions at https://doc.rust-lang.org/cargo/reference/manifest.html + +[dependencies] +bounded-vec = { version = "0.7.1", features = ["serde"] } +serde = { version = "1", features = ["derive"], optional = true } + +[features] +serde = ["dep:serde", "bounded-vec/serde"] diff --git a/crates/fido-common/src/attestation.rs b/crates/fido-common/src/attestation.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0f02fdb --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/fido-common/src/attestation.rs @@ -0,0 +1,72 @@ +#[cfg(feature = "serde")] +use serde::{Serialize, Deserialize}; + +/// > Attestation statement formats are identified by a string, called an +/// > attestation statement format identifier, chosen by the author of the +/// > attestation statement format. +/// > +/// > Attestation statement format identifiers SHOULD be registered in the IANA +/// > "WebAuthn Attestation Statement Format Identifiers" registry +/// > [IANA-WebAuthn-Registries] established by [RFC8809]. All registered +/// > attestation statement format identifiers are unique amongst themselves as +/// > a matter of course. +/// > +/// > Unregistered attestation statement format identifiers SHOULD use lowercase +/// > reverse domain-name naming, using a domain name registered by the +/// > developer, in order to assure uniqueness of the identifier. All +/// > attestation statement format identifiers MUST be a maximum of 32 octets in +/// > length and MUST consist only of printable USASCII characters, excluding +/// > backslash and doublequote, i.e., VCHAR as defined in [RFC5234] but without +/// > %x22 and %x5c. +/// > +/// > > Note: This means attestation statement format identifiers based on +/// > > domain names MUST incorporate only LDH Labels [RFC5890]. +/// > +/// > Implementations MUST match `WebAuthn` attestation statement format +/// > identifiers in a case-sensitive fashion. +/// > +/// > Attestation statement formats that may exist in multiple versions SHOULD +/// > include a version in their identifier. In effect, different versions are +/// > thus treated as different formats, e.g., packed2 as a new version of the § +/// > 8.2 Packed Attestation Statement Format. +/// > +/// > The following sections present a set of currently-defined and registered +/// > attestation statement formats and their identifiers. The up-to-date list +/// > of registered `WebAuthn` Extensions is maintained in the IANA "WebAuthn +/// > Attestation Statement Format Identifiers" registry +/// > [IANA-WebAuthn-Registries] established by [RFC8809]. +#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)] +#[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", derive(Serialize, Deserialize))] +pub enum FormatIdentifier { + /// > The "packed" attestation statement format is a WebAuthn-optimized + /// > format for attestation. It uses a very compact but still extensible + /// > encoding method. This format is implementable by authenticators with + /// > limited resources (e.g., secure elements). + #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", serde(rename = "packed"))] + Packed, + /// > The TPM attestation statement format returns an attestation statement + /// > in the same format as the packed attestation statement format, + /// > although the rawData and signature fields are computed differently. + #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", serde(rename = "tpm"))] + Tpm, + /// > Platform authenticators on versions "N", and later, may provide this + /// > proprietary "hardware attestation" statement. + #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", serde(rename = "android-key"))] + AndroidKey, + /// > Android-based platform authenticators MAY produce an attestation + /// > statement based on the Android SafetyNet API. + #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", serde(rename = "android-safetynet"))] + AndroidSafetyNet, + /// > Used with FIDO U2F authenticators + #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", serde(rename = "fido-u2f"))] + FidoU2f, + /// > Used with Apple devices' platform authenticators + #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", serde(rename = "apple"))] + Apple, + /// > Used to replace any authenticator-provided attestation statement when + /// > a WebAuthn Relying Party indicates it does not wish to receive + /// > attestation information. + #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", serde(rename = "none"))] + None, +} + diff --git a/crates/fido-common/src/credential/mod.rs b/crates/fido-common/src/credential/mod.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000..00d31b2 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/fido-common/src/credential/mod.rs @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +pub mod public_key; + +#[cfg(feature = "serde")] +use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize}; + +/// > This enumeration defines the valid credential types. It is an +/// > extension point; values can be added to it in the future, as +/// > more credential types are defined. The values of this +/// > enumeration are used for versioning the Authentication +/// > Assertion and attestation structures according to the type of +/// > the authenticator. +#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy)] +#[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", derive(Serialize, Deserialize))] +#[non_exhaustive] +pub enum Type { + #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", serde(rename = "public-key"))] + PublicKey, +} diff --git a/crates/fido-common/src/credential/public_key.rs b/crates/fido-common/src/credential/public_key.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0449397 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/fido-common/src/credential/public_key.rs @@ -0,0 +1,93 @@ +use crate::registry::algorithms; +use crate::{credential, Transport}; +use bounded_vec::BoundedVec; +use std::collections::HashSet; + +#[cfg(feature = "serde")] +use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize}; + +/// > This dictionary is used to supply additional parameters when +/// > creating a new credential. +#[derive(Debug)] +#[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", derive(Serialize, Deserialize))] +pub struct Parameters { + /// > This member specifies the type of credential to be + /// > created. + #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", serde(rename = "type"))] + pub credential_type: credential::Type, + /// # `WebAuthn` Specs + /// > This member specifies the cryptographic signature + /// > algorithm with which the newly generated credential will + /// > be used, and thus also the type of asymmetric key pair to + /// > be generated, e.g., RSA or Elliptic Curve. + #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", serde(rename = "alg"))] + pub algorithm: algorithms::Signature, +} + +/// > This dictionary identifies a specific public key credential. +#[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", derive(Serialize, Deserialize))] +#[derive(Debug)] +pub struct Descriptor { + /// > This member contains the type of the public key credential + /// > the caller is referring to. + #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", serde(rename = "type"))] + pub credential_type: credential::Type, + /// > A probabilistically-unique byte sequence identifying a + /// > public key credential source and its authentication + /// > assertions. + pub id: BoundedVec, + /// > This... member contains a hint as to how the client might + /// > communicate with the managing authenticator of the public + /// > key credential the caller is referring to. + pub transports: Option>, +} + +/// > This `PublicKeyCredentialUserEntity` data structure describes the user +/// > account to which the new public key credential will be associated at +/// > the RP. +/// Due to deprecation, the `icon` URL is omitted. See . +#[derive(Debug)] +#[cfg_attr( + feature = "serde", + derive(Serialize, Deserialize), + serde(rename_all = "camelCase") +)] +pub struct UserEntity { + /// > an RP-specific user account identifier + // Justfication for type from WebAuthn Specs: + // > The user handle of the user account. A user handle is an opaque byte sequence with a + // > maximum size of 64 bytes, and is not meant to be displayed to the user. + // > + // + // CTAP says that "while an empty account identifier is valid, it has known + // interoperability hurdles in practice and platforms are RECOMMENDED to avoid sending + // them." + // + // WebAuthn says that "The user handle MUST NOT be empty." To maximimize compatibility, the + // definition from the CTAP specs is used. + pub id: BoundedVec, + /// > a human-palatable identifier for a user account. It is intended + /// > only for display, i.e., aiding the user in determining the + /// > difference between user accounts with similar displayNames. For + /// > example, "alexm", "alex.mueller@example.com" or "+14255551234". + // TODO: Figure out the String metadata encoding per https://w3c.github.io/webauthn/#sctn-strings-langdir + pub name: Option, + /// > A human-palatable name for the user account, intended only for + /// > display. For example, "Alex Müller" or "田中倫". The Relying Party + /// > SHOULD let the user choose this, and SHOULD NOT restrict the + /// > choice more than necessary. + pub display_name: Option, +} + +/// > This `PublicKeyCredentialRpEntity` data structure describes a Relying +/// > Party with which the new public key credential will be associated. +#[derive(Debug)] +#[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", derive(Serialize, Deserialize))] +pub struct RelyingPartyEntity { + /// > A unique identifier for the Relying Party entity. + pub id: String, + /// > it is a human-palatable identifier for the Relying Party, intended + /// > only for display. For example, "ACME Corporation", "Wonderful + /// > Widgets, Inc." or "ОАО Примертех". + pub name: String, +} diff --git a/crates/fido-common/src/extension.rs b/crates/fido-common/src/extension.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000..15caa20 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/fido-common/src/extension.rs @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +/// > Extensions are identified by a string, called an extension identifier, +/// > chosen by the extension author. +/// > +/// > Extension identifiers SHOULD be registered in the IANA "WebAuthn Extension +/// > Identifiers" registry [IANA-WebAuthn-Registries] established by [RFC8809]. +/// > All registered extension identifiers are unique amongst themselves as a +/// > matter of course. +/// > +/// > Unregistered extension identifiers SHOULD aim to be globally unique, e.g., +/// > by including the defining entity such as `myCompany_extension`. +/// > +/// > All extension identifiers MUST be a maximum of 32 octets in length and +/// > MUST consist only of printable USASCII characters, excluding backslash and +/// > doublequote, i.e., VCHAR as defined in [RFC5234] but without %x22 and +/// > %x5c. Implementations MUST match `WebAuthn` extension identifiers in a +/// > case-sensitive fashion. +/// > +/// > Extensions that may exist in multiple versions should take care to include +/// > a version in their identifier. In effect, different versions are thus +/// > treated as different extensions, e.g., `myCompany_extension_01` +pub enum Identifier { + AppId, + TransactionAuthSimple, + TransactionAuthGeneric, + AuthenticationSelection, + Extensions, + UserVerificationIndex, + Location, + UserVerificationMethod, + CredentialProtection, + CredentialBlob, + LargeBlobKey, + MinPinLength, + HmacSecret, + AppIdExclude, + CredentialProperties, + LargeBlob, +} diff --git a/crates/fido-common/src/lib.rs b/crates/fido-common/src/lib.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000..50ba861 --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/fido-common/src/lib.rs @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +pub mod attestation; +pub mod credential; +pub mod extension; +pub mod registry; + +#[cfg(feature = "serde")] +use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize}; + +/// > Authenticators may implement various transports for communicating with +/// > clients. This enumeration defines hints as to how clients might +/// > communicate with a particular authenticator in order to obtain an +/// > assertion for a specific credential. Note that these hints represent the +/// > `WebAuthn` Relying Party's best belief as to how an authenticator may be +/// > reached. A Relying Party will typically learn of the supported transports +/// > for a public key credential via getTransports(). +#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, Debug)] +#[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", derive(Serialize, Deserialize), serde(untagged))] +pub enum Transport { + /// > Indicates the respective authenticator can be contacted over removable + /// > USB. + #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", serde(rename = "usb"))] + Usb, + /// > Indicates the respective authenticator can be contacted over Near + /// > Field Communication (NFC). + #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", serde(rename = "nfc"))] + Nfc, + /// > Indicates the respective authenticator can be contacted over Bluetooth + /// > Smart (Bluetooth Low Energy / BLE). + #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", serde(rename = "ble"))] + Ble, + /// > Indicates the respective authenticator can be contacted using a + /// > combination of (often separate) data-transport and proximity + /// > mechanisms. This supports, for example, authentication on a desktop + /// > computer using a smartphone. + #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", serde(rename = "hybrid"))] + Hybrid, + /// > Indicates the respective authenticator is contacted using a client + /// > device-specific transport, i.e., it is a platform authenticator. These + /// > authenticators are not removable from the client device. + #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", serde(rename = "internal"))] + Internal, + Unknown(String), +} diff --git a/crates/fido-common/src/registry.rs b/crates/fido-common/src/registry.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2cd8dfd --- /dev/null +++ b/crates/fido-common/src/registry.rs @@ -0,0 +1,492 @@ +#[cfg(feature = "serde")] +use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize}; + +/// > The [`UserVerify`] constants are flags in a bitfield represented as a 32 +/// > bit long integer. They describe the methods and capabilities of a FIDO +/// > authenticator for locally verifying a user. The operational details of +/// > these methods are opaque to the server. These constants are used in the +/// > authoritative metadata for FIDO authenticators, reported and queried +/// > through the UAF Discovery APIs, and used to form authenticator policies in +/// > UAF protocol messages. Each constant has a case-sensitive string +/// > representation (in quotes), which is used in the authoritative metadata +/// > for FIDO authenticators. +#[repr(u32)] +#[derive(Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Clone, Copy, Hash)] +#[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", derive(Serialize, Deserialize))] +pub enum UserVerify { + /// > This flag MUST be set if the authenticator is able to confirm user + /// > presence in any fashion. If this flag and no other is set for user + /// > verification, the guarantee is only that the authenticator cannot be + /// > operated without some human intervention, not necessarily that the + /// > sensing of "presence" provides any level of user verification (e.g. a + /// > device that requires a button press to activate). + #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", serde(rename = "presence_internal"))] + PresenceInternal = 0x0000_0001, + + /// > This flag MUST be set if the authenticator uses any type of + /// > measurement of a fingerprint for user verification. + #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", serde(rename = "fingerprint_internal"))] + FingerprintInternal = 0x0000_0002, + + /// > This flag MUST be set if the authenticator uses a local-only passcode + /// > (i.e. a passcode not known by the server) for user verification. + #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", serde(rename = "passcode_internal"))] + PasscodeInternal = 0x0000_0004, + + /// > This flag MUST be set if the authenticator uses a local-only passcode + /// > (i.e. a passcode not known by the server) for user verification. + #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", serde(rename = "voiceprint_internal"))] + VoiceprintInternal = 0x0000_0008, + + /// > This flag MUST be set if the authenticator uses any manner of face + /// > recognition to verify the user. + #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", serde(rename = "faceprint_internal"))] + FaceprintInternal = 0x0000_0010, + + /// > This flag MUST be set if the authenticator uses any form of location + /// > sensor or measurement for user verification. + #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", serde(rename = "location_internal"))] + LocationInternal = 0x0000_0020, + + /// > This flag MUST be set if the authenticator uses any form of eye + /// > biometrics for user verification. + #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", serde(rename = "eyeprint_internal"))] + EyeprintInternal = 0x0000_0040, + + /// > This flag MUST be set if the authenticator uses a drawn pattern for + /// > user verification. + #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", serde(rename = "pattern_internal"))] + PatternInternal = 0x0000_0080, + + /// > This flag MUST be set if the authenticator uses any measurement of a + /// > full hand (including palm-print, hand geometry or vein geometry) for + /// > user verification. + #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", serde(rename = "handprint_internal"))] + HandprintInternal = 0x0000_0100, + + /// > This flag MUST be set if the authenticator uses a local-only passcode + /// > (i.e. a passcode not known by the server) for user verification that + /// > might be gathered outside the authenticator boundary. + #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", serde(rename = "passcode_external"))] + PasscodeExternal = 0x0000_0800, + + /// > This flag MUST be set if the authenticator uses a drawn pattern for + /// > user verification that might be gathered outside the authenticator + /// > boundary. + #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", serde(rename = "pattern_external"))] + PatternExternal = 0x0000_1000, + + /// > This flag MUST be set if the authenticator will respond without any + /// > user interaction (e.g. Silent Authenticator). + #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", serde(rename = "none"))] + None = 0x0000_0200, + + /// > If an authenticator sets multiple flags for the "_INTERNAL" and/or + /// > "_EXTERNAL" user verification types, it MAY also set this flag to + /// > indicate that all verification methods with respective flags set will + /// > be enforced (e.g. faceprint AND voiceprint). If flags for multiple + /// > user verification methods are set and this flag is not set, + /// > verification with only one is necessary (e.g. fingerprint OR + /// > passcode). + #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", serde(rename = "all"))] + All = 0x0000_0400, +} + +/// > The [`KeyProtection`] constants are flags in a bit field represented as a +/// > 16 bit long integer. They describe the method an authenticator uses to +/// > protect the private key material for FIDO registrations. Refer to +/// > [UAFAuthnrCommands] for more details on the relevance of keys and key +/// > protection. These constants are reported and queried through the UAF +/// > Discovery APIs and used to form authenticator policies in UAF protocol +/// > messages. Each constant has a case-sensitive string representation (in +/// > quotes), which is used in the authoritative metadata for FIDO +/// > authenticators. +/// > +/// > When used in metadata describing an authenticator, several of these flags +/// > are exclusive of others (i.e. can not be combined) - the certified +/// > metadata may have at most one of the mutually exclusive string constant +/// > values. When used in authenticator policy, any bit may be set to 1, e.g. +/// > to indicate that a server is willing to accept authenticators using either +/// > [`KeyProtection::Software`] or [`KeyProtection::Hardware`]. +/// > +/// > > ## NOTE +/// > > These flags must be set according to the effective security of the keys, +/// > > in order to follow the assumptions made in [FIDOSecRef]. For example, if +/// > > a key is stored in a secure element but software running on the FIDO +/// > > User Device could call a function in the secure element to export the +/// > > key either in the clear or using an arbitrary wrapping key, then the +/// > > effective security is [`KeyProtection::Software`] and not +/// > > [`KeyProtection::SecureElement`]. +#[repr(u16)] +#[derive(Debug)] +#[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", derive(Deserialize, Serialize))] +pub enum KeyProtection { + /// > This flag MUST be set if the authenticator uses software-based key + /// > management. Exclusive in authenticator metadata with + /// > [`KeyProtection::Hardware`], [`KeyProtection::Tee`], + /// > [`KeyProtection::SecureElement`] + #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", serde(rename = "software"))] + Software = 0x0001, + + /// > This flag SHOULD be set if the authenticator uses hardware-based key + /// > management. Exclusive in authenticator metadata with + /// > [`KeyProtection::Software`] + #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", serde(rename = "hardware"))] + Hardware = 0x0002, + + /// > This flag SHOULD be set if the authenticator uses the Trusted + /// > Execution Environment (TEE) for key management. In authenticator + /// > metadata, this flag should be set in conjunction with + /// > [`KeyProtection::Hardware`]. Mutually exclusive in authenticator + /// > metadata with [`KeyProtection::Software`], + /// > [`KeyProtection::SecureElement`] + #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", serde(rename = "tee"))] + Tee = 0x0004, + + /// > This flag SHOULD be set if the authenticator uses a Secure Element + /// > for key management. In authenticator metadata, this + /// > flag should be set in conjunction with [`KeyProtection::Hardware`]. + /// > Mutually exclusive in authenticator metadata with + /// > [`KeyProtection::Tee`],[`KeyProtection::Software`] + #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", serde(rename = "secure_element"))] + SecureElement = 0x0008, + + /// > This flag MUST be set if the authenticator does not store (wrapped) + /// > UAuth keys at the client, but relies on a server-provided key handle. + /// > This flag MUST be set in conjunction with one of the other + /// > [`KeyProtection`] flags to indicate how the local key handle wrapping + /// > key and operations are protected. Servers MAY unset this flag in + /// > authenticator policy if they are not prepared to store and return key + /// > handles, for example, if they have a requirement to respond + /// > indistinguishably to authentication attempts against userIDs that do + /// > and do not exist. Refer to [UAFProtocol] for more details. + #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", serde(rename = "remote_handle"))] + RemoteHandle = 0x0010, +} + +/// > The [`MatcherProtection`] constants are flags in a bit field represented +/// > as a 16 bit long integer. They describe the method an authenticator uses +/// > to protect the matcher that performs user verification. These constants +/// > are reported and queried through the UAF Discovery APIs and used to form +/// > authenticator policies in UAF protocol messages. Refer to +/// > [UAFAuthnrCommands] for more details on the matcher component. Each +/// > constant has a case-sensitive string representation (in quotes), which is +/// > used in the authoritative metadata for FIDO authenticators. +/// > +/// > > ## NOTE +/// > > These flags must be set according to the effective security of the +/// > > matcher, in order to follow the assumptions made in [FIDOSecRef]. For +/// > > example, if a passcode based matcher is implemented in a secure element, +/// > > but the passcode is expected to be provided as unauthenticated +/// > > parameter, then the effective security is +/// > > [`MatcherProtection::Software`] and not [`MatcherProtection::OnChip`]. +#[repr(u16)] +#[derive(Debug)] +#[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", derive(Deserialize, Serialize))] +pub enum MatcherProtection { + /// > This flag MUST be set if the authenticator's matcher is running in + /// > software. Exclusive in authenticator metadata with + /// > [`MatcherProtection::Tee`], [`MatcherProtection::OnChip`] + #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", serde(rename = "software"))] + Software = 0x0001, + /// > This flag SHOULD be set if the authenticator's matcher is running + /// > inside the Trusted Execution Environment (TEE). Mutually exclusive in + /// > authenticator metadata with [`MatcherProtection::Software`], + /// > [`MatcherProtection::OnChip`] + #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", serde(rename = "tee"))] + Tee = 0x0002, + /// > This flag SHOULD be set if the authenticator's matcher is running on + /// > the chip. Mutually exclusive in authenticator metadata with + /// > [`MatcherProtection::Tee`], [`MatcherProtection::Software`] + #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", serde(rename = "on_chip"))] + OnChip = 0x0004, +} + +/// > The [`AttachmentHint`] constants are flags in a bit field represented as a +/// > 32 bit long. They describe the method FIDO authenticators use to +/// > communicate with the FIDO User Device. These constants are reported and +/// > queried through the UAF Discovery APIs [UAFAppAPIAndTransport], and used +/// > to form Authenticator policies in UAF protocol messages. Because the +/// > connection state and topology of an authenticator may be transient, these +/// > values are only hints that can be used by server-supplied policy to guide +/// > the user experience, e.g. to prefer a device that is connected and ready +/// > for authenticating or confirming a low-value transaction, rather than one +/// > that is more secure but requires more user effort. Each constant has a +/// > case-sensitive string representation (in quotes), which is used in the +/// > authoritative metadata for FIDO authenticators. +/// > +/// > > ## NOTE +/// > > These flags are not a mandatory part of authenticator metadata and, when +/// > > present, only indicate possible states that may be reported during +/// > > authenticator discovery. +#[repr(u32)] +#[derive(Debug)] +#[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", derive(Deserialize, Serialize))] +pub enum AttachmentHint { + /// > This flag MAY be set to indicate that the authenticator is permanently + /// > attached to the FIDO User Device. + /// > + /// > A device such as a smartphone may have authenticator functionality + /// > that is able to be used both locally and remotely. In such a case, the + /// > FIDO client MUST filter and exclusively report only the relevant bit + /// > during Discovery and when performing policy matching. + /// > + /// > This flag cannot be combined with any other ATTACHMENT_HINT flags. + #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", serde(rename = "internal"))] + Internal = 0x0001, + + /// > This flag MAY be set to indicate, for a hardware-based authenticator, + /// > that it is removable or remote from the FIDO User Device. + /// > + /// > A device such as a smartphone may have authenticator functionality + /// > that is able to be used both locally and remotely. In such a case, the + /// > FIDO UAF Client MUST filter and exclusively report only the relevant + /// > bit during discovery and when performing policy matching. This flag + /// > MUST be combined with one or more other [`AttachmentHint`] flag(s). + #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", serde(rename = "external"))] + External = 0x0002, + + /// > This flag MAY be set to indicate that an external authenticator + /// > currently has an exclusive wired connection, e.g. through USB, + /// > Firewire or similar, to the FIDO User Device. + #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", serde(rename = "wired"))] + Wired = 0x0004, + + /// > This flag MAY be set to indicate that an external authenticator + /// > communicates with the FIDO User Device through a personal area or + /// > otherwise non-routed wireless protocol, such as Bluetooth or NFC. + #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", serde(rename = "wireless"))] + Wireless = 0x0008, + + /// > This flag MAY be set to indicate that an external authenticator is + /// > able to communicate by NFC to the FIDO User Device. As part of + /// > authenticator metadata, or when reporting characteristics through + /// > discovery, if this flag is set, the [`AttachmentHint::Wireless`] flag + /// > SHOULD also be set as well. + #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", serde(rename = "nfc"))] + Nfc = 0x0010, + + /// > This flag MAY be set to indicate that an external authenticator is + /// > able to communicate using Bluetooth with the FIDO User Device. As part + /// > of authenticator metadata, or when reporting characteristics through + /// > discovery, if this flag is set, the [`AttachmentHint::Wireless`] flag + /// > SHOULD also be set. + #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", serde(rename = "bluetooth"))] + Bluetooth = 0x0020, + + /// > This flag MAY be set to indicate that the authenticator is connected + /// > to the FIDO User Device over a non-exclusive network (e.g. over a + /// > TCP/IP LAN or WAN, as opposed to a PAN or point-to-point connection). + #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", serde(rename = "network"))] + Network = 0x0040, + + /// > This flag MAY be set to indicate that an external authenticator is in + /// > a "ready" state. This flag is set by the ASM at its discretion. + /// > + /// > > ## NOTE + /// > > Generally this should indicate that the device is immediately + /// > > available to perform user verification without additional actions + /// > > such as connecting the device or creating a new biometric profile + /// > > enrollment, but the exact meaning may vary for different types of + /// > > devices. For example, a USB authenticator may only report itself as + /// > > ready when it is plugged in, or a Bluetooth authenticator when it is + /// > > paired and connected, but an NFC-based authenticator may always + /// > > report itself as ready. + #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", serde(rename = "ready"))] + Ready = 0x0080, + + /// > This flag MAY be set to indicate that an external authenticator is + /// > able to communicate using WiFi Direct with the FIDO User Device. As + /// > part of authenticator metadata and when reporting characteristics + /// > through discovery, if this flag is set, the + /// > [`AttachmentHint::Wireless`] flag SHOULD also be set. + #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", serde(rename = "wifi_direct"))] + WifiDirect = 0x0100, +} + +/// > The [`TransactionConfirmationDisplay`] constants are flags in a bit field +/// > represented as a 16 bit long integer. They describe the availability and +/// > implementation of a transaction confirmation display capability required +/// > for the transaction confirmation operation. These constants are reported +/// > and queried through the UAF Discovery APIs and used to form authenticator +/// > policies in UAF protocol messages. Each constant has a case-sensitive +/// > string representation (in quotes), which is used in the authoritative +/// > metadata for FIDO authenticators. Refer to [UAFAuthnrCommands] for more +/// > details on the security aspects of TransactionConfirmation Display. +#[repr(u16)] +#[derive(Debug)] +#[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", derive(Deserialize, Serialize))] +pub enum TransactionConfirmationDisplay { + /// > This flag MUST be set to indicate that a transaction confirmation + /// > display, of any type, is available on this authenticator. Other + /// > [`TransactionConfirmationDisplay`] flags MAY also be set if this flag + /// > is set. If the authenticator does not support a transaction + /// > confirmation display, then the value of + /// > [`TransactionConfirmationDisplay`] MUST be set to 0. + #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", serde(rename = "any"))] + Any = 0x0001, + + /// > This flag MUST be set to indicate, that a software-based transaction + /// > confirmation display operating in a privileged context is available on + /// > this authenticator. + /// > + /// > A FIDO client that is capable of providing this capability MAY set + /// > this bit (in conjunction with [`TransactionDisplayConfirm::Any`]) for + /// > all authenticators of type [`AttachmentHint::Internal`], even if the + /// > authoritative metadata for the authenticator does not indicate this + /// > capability. + /// > + /// > > ## NOTE + /// > > Software based transaction confirmation displays might be + /// > > implemented within the boundaries of the ASM rather than by the + /// > > authenticator itself [UAFASM]. + /// > + /// > This flag is mutually exclusive with + /// > [`TransactionConfirmationDisplay::Tee`] and + /// > [`TransactionConfirmationDisplay::Hardware`]. + #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", serde(rename = "privileged_software"))] + PrivilegedSoftware = 0x0002, + + /// > This flag SHOULD be set to indicate that the authenticator implements + /// > a transaction confirmation display in a Trusted Execution Environment + /// > ([TEE], [TEESecureDisplay]). This flag is mutually exclusive with + /// > [`TransactionConfirmationDisplay::PrivilegedSoftware`] and + /// > [`TransactionConfirmationDisplay::Hardware`]. + #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", serde(rename = "tee"))] + Tee = 0x0004, + + /// > This flag SHOULD be set to indicate that a transaction confirmation + /// > display based on hardware assisted capabilities is available on this + /// > authenticator. This flag is mutually exclusive with + /// > [`TransactionConfirmationDisplay::PrivilegedSoftware`] and + /// > [`TransactionConfirmationDisplay::Tee`]. + #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", serde(rename = "hardware"))] + Hardware = 0x0008, + + /// > This flag SHOULD be set to indicate that the transaction confirmation + /// > display is provided on a distinct device from the FIDO User Device. + /// > This flag can be combined with any other flag. + #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", serde(rename = "remote"))] + Remote = 0x0010, +} + +pub mod algorithms { + //! > These tags indicate the specific authentication algorithms, public key + //! > formats and other crypto relevant data. + + #[cfg(feature = "serde")] + use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize}; + + /// > The [`Signature`] constants are 16 bit long integers indicating the + /// > specific signature algorithm and encoding. + /// > + /// > Each constant has a case-sensitive string representation (in quotes), + /// > which is used in the authoritative metadata for FIDO authenticators. + #[repr(u16)] + #[derive(Debug)] + #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", derive(Deserialize, Serialize))] + pub enum Signature { + #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", serde(rename = "secp256r1_ecdsa_sha256_raw"))] + Secp256r1EcdsaSha256Raw = 0x0001, + #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", serde(rename = "secp256r1_ecdsa_sha256_der"))] + Secp256r1EcdsaSha256Der = 0x0002, + #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", serde(rename = "rsassa_pss_sha256_raw"))] + RsaSsaPssSha256Raw = 0x0003, + #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", serde(rename = "rsassa_pss_sha256_der"))] + RsaSsaPssSha256Der = 0x0004, + #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", serde(rename = "secp256k1_ecdsa_sha256_raw"))] + Secp256k1EcdsaSha256Raw = 0x0005, + #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", serde(rename = "secp256k1_ecdsa_sha256_der"))] + Secp256k1EcdsaSha256Der = 0x0006, + #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", serde(rename = "sm2_sm3_raw"))] + Sm2Sm3Raw = 0x0007, + #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", serde(rename = "rsa_emsa_pkcs1_sha256_raw"))] + RsaEmsaPkcs1Sha256Raw = 0x0008, + #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", serde(rename = "rsa_emsa_pkcs1_sha256_der"))] + RsaEmsaPkcs1Sha256Der = 0x0009, + #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", serde(rename = "rsassa_pss_sha384_raw"))] + RsaSsaPsSha384Raw = 0x000A, + #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", serde(rename = "rsassa_pss_sha512_raw"))] + RsaSsaPssSha512Raw = 0x000B, + #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", serde(rename = "rsassa_pkcsv15_sha256_raw"))] + RsaSsaPkcsv15Sha256Raw = 0x000C, + #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", serde(rename = "rsassa_pkcsv15_sha384_raw"))] + RsaSsaPkcsv15Sha384Raw = 0x000D, + #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", serde(rename = "rsassa_pkcsv15_sha512_raw"))] + RsaSsaPkcsv15Sha512Raw = 0x000E, + #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", serde(rename = "rsassa_pkcsv15_sha1_raw"))] + RsaSsaPkcsv15Sha1Raw = 0x000F, + #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", serde(rename = "secp384r1_ecdsa_sha384_raw"))] + Secp384r1EcdsaSha384Raw = 0x0010, + #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", serde(rename = "secp521r1_ecdsa_sha512_raw"))] + Secp521r1EcdsaSha512Raw = 0x0011, + #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", serde(rename = "ed25519_eddsa_sha512_raw"))] + Ed25519EddsaSha512Raw = 0x0012, + #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", serde(rename = "ed448_eddsa_sha512_raw"))] + Ed448EddsaSha512Raw = 0x0013, + } + + /// > The [`PublicKey`] constants are 16 bit long integers indicating the + /// > specific Public Key algorithm and encoding. + #[repr(u16)] + #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", derive(Serialize, Deserialize))] + pub enum PublicKey { + #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", serde(rename = "ecc_x962_raw"))] + EccX962Raw = 0x0100, + #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", serde(rename = "ecc_x962_der"))] + EccX962Der = 0x0101, + #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", serde(rename = "rsa_2048_raw"))] + Rsa2048Raw = 0x0102, + #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", serde(rename = "rsa_2048_der"))] + Rsa2048Der = 0x0103, + #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", serde(rename = "cose"))] + Cose = 0x0104, + } +} + +/// > The [`Attestation`] constants are 16 bit long integers indicating the +/// > specific attestation that authenticator supports. +#[repr(u16)] +#[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", derive(Serialize, Deserialize))] +pub enum Attestation { + /// > Indicates full basic attestation, based on an attestation private key + /// > shared among a class of authenticators (e.g. same model). + /// > Authenticators must provide its attestation signature during the + /// > registration process for the same reason. The attestation trust anchor + /// > is shared with FIDO Servers out of band (as part of the Metadata). + /// > This sharing process should be done according to + /// > [FIDOMetadataService]. + #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", serde(rename = "basic_full"))] + BasicFull = 0x3E07, + /// > Just syntactically a Basic Attestation. The attestation object + /// > self-signed, i.e. it is signed using the UAuth.priv key, i.e. the key + /// > corresponding to the UAuth.pub key included in the attestation object. + /// > As a consequence it does not provide a cryptographic proof of the + /// > security characteristics. But it is the best thing we can do if the + /// > authenticator is not able to have an attestation private key. + #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", serde(rename = "basic_surrogate"))] + BasicSurrogate = 0x3E08, + /// > Indicates use of elliptic curve based direct anonymous attestation as + /// > defined in [FIDOEcdaaAlgorithm]. Support for this attestation type is + /// > optional at this time. It might be required by FIDO Certification. + #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", serde(rename = "ecdaa"))] + EllipticCurveDirectAnonymous = 0x3E09, + /// > Indicates PrivacyCA attestation as defined in + /// > [TCG-CMCProfile-AIKCertEnroll]. Support for this attestation type is + /// > optional at this time. It might be required by FIDO Certification. + #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", serde(rename = "attca"))] + PrivacyCA = 0x3E0A, + /// > In this case, the authenticator uses an Anonymization CA which + /// > dynamically generates per-credential attestation certificates such + /// > that the attestation statements presented to Relying Parties do not + /// > provide uniquely identifiable information, e.g., that might be used + /// > for tracking purposes. The applicable [WebAuthn] attestation formats + /// > "fmt" are Google SafetyNet Attestation "android-safetynet", Android + /// > Keystore Attestation "android-key", Apple Anonymous Attestation + /// > "apple", and Apple Application Attestation "apple-appattest". + #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", serde(rename = "anonca"))] + AnonymizationCA = 0x3E0C, + /// > Indicates absence of attestation. + #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", serde(rename = "none"))] + None = 0x3E0B, +}