diff --git a/crates/fido-common/Cargo.toml b/crates/fido-common/Cargo.toml index 9981f22..5d1f529 100644 --- a/crates/fido-common/Cargo.toml +++ b/crates/fido-common/Cargo.toml @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ edition = "2021" ciborium = { version = "0.2.1", default-features = false, optional = true } coset = { version = "0.3.4", default-features = false } serde = { version = "1", features = ["derive"], optional = true } +bitflags = { version = "2.2.1", default-features = false, optional = true } [features] -serde = ["dep:serde", "dep:ciborium"] +serde = ["dep:serde", "dep:bitflags", "dep:ciborium"] diff --git a/crates/fido-common/src/authenticator.rs b/crates/fido-common/src/authenticator.rs index de0a26f..ab1cd55 100644 --- a/crates/fido-common/src/authenticator.rs +++ b/crates/fido-common/src/authenticator.rs @@ -5,7 +5,12 @@ use crate::{ }; use std::collections::BTreeMap; -pub enum Flags {} +#[cfg(feature = "serde")] +use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize}; + +#[cfg(feature = "serde")] +use bitflags::bitflags; + #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)] pub enum UserPresence { Present, @@ -28,6 +33,7 @@ pub enum UserVerification { /// > software, connected to the client over a secure channel. In both cases, /// > the Relying Party receives the authenticator data in the same format, and /// > uses its knowledge of the authenticator to make trust decisions. +#[derive(Debug)] pub struct Data { /// > SHA-256 hash of the RP ID the credential is scoped to. pub relying_party_id_hash: Sha256Hash, @@ -40,27 +46,121 @@ pub struct Data { pub extensions: Option>>, } -impl Data { - fn try_from(value: &[u8]) -> Option { - // 32 bytes: RP id hash - let rp_id = value.get(0..32)?.as_ref(); - // - let flags = value.get(32)?; - - None +#[cfg(feature = "serde")] +bitflags! { + #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord, Hash)] + // > Flags (bit 0 is the least significant bit): + struct DataFlags: u8 { + // > Bit 0: User Present (UP) result. + // > 1 means the user is present. + const USER_PRESENCE = 0b1 << 0; + // > Bit 2: User Verified (UV) result. + // > 1 means the user is verified. + const USER_VERIFIED = 0b1 << 2; + // > Bit 3: Backup Eligibility (BE). + // > 1 means the public key credential source is backup eligible. + const BACKUP_ELIGIBLE = 0b1 << 3; + // > Bit 4: Backup State (BS). + // > 1 means the public key credential source is currently backed up. + const BACKUP_STATE = 0b1 << 4; + // > Bit 6: Attested credential data included (AT). + // > Indicates whether the authenticator added attested credential data. + const ATTESTED_CREDENTIAL_DATA = 0b1 << 6; + // > Bit 7: Extension data included (ED). + // > Indicates if the authenticator data has extensions. + const EXTENSION_DATA_INCLUDED = 0b1 << 7; } } -impl TryFrom<&[u8]> for Data { - type Error = (); +#[cfg(feature = "serde")] +impl DataFlags { + fn user_presence(&self) -> UserPresence { + if self.contains(DataFlags::USER_PRESENCE) { + UserPresence::Present + } else { + UserPresence::NotPresent + } + } + + fn user_verification(&self) -> UserVerification { + if self.contains(DataFlags::USER_VERIFIED) { + UserVerification::Verified + } else { + UserVerification::NotVerified + } + } + + fn backup_eligibility(&self) -> BackupEligibility { + if self.contains(DataFlags::BACKUP_ELIGIBLE) { + BackupEligibility::Eligible + } else { + BackupEligibility::Ineligible + } + } + + fn backup_state(&self) -> BackupState { + if self.contains(DataFlags::BACKUP_STATE) { + BackupState::BackedUp + } else { + BackupState::NotBackedUp + } + } - fn try_from(value: &[u8]) -> Result { - Self::try_from(value).ok_or(()) + fn has_attested_credential_data(&self) -> bool { + self.contains(DataFlags::ATTESTED_CREDENTIAL_DATA) } } #[cfg(feature = "serde")] -use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize}; +impl<'de> Deserialize<'de> for Data { + fn deserialize(deserializer: D) -> Result + where + D: serde::Deserializer<'de>, + { + use serde::de; + + let data = Vec::::deserialize(deserializer)?; + + // The authenticator data structure is a byte array of 37 bytes or more + if data.len() < 37 { + return Err(de::Error::invalid_length(data.len(), &"at least 37 bytes")); + } + + // SAFETY: split_array_ref panics if const param is out of bounds for slice. + // data.len() guard protects against out of bounds indicies. + + // rpIdHash: 32 Bytes + // > SHA-256 hash of the RP ID the credential is scoped to. + let (&relying_party_id_hash, data): (&Sha256Hash, _) = data.split_array_ref::<32>(); + + // flags: 1 Byte + let (&[flags], data): (&[u8; 1], _) = data.split_array_ref::<1>(); + let flags = DataFlags::from_bits_truncate(flags); + + // signCount: 4 Bytes + // > Signature counter, 32-bit unsigned big-endian integer. + let (&counter_be_bytes, data) = data.split_array_ref::<4>(); + let signature_counter = u32::from_be_bytes(counter_be_bytes); + + let attested_credential_data: Option = + if flags.has_attested_credential_data() { + Some(attestation::CredentialData::try_from(data).map_err(de::Error::custom)?) + } else { + None + }; + + Ok(Self { + relying_party_id_hash, + user_presence: flags.user_presence(), + user_verification: flags.user_verification(), + backup_eligibility: flags.backup_eligibility(), + backup_state: flags.backup_state(), + signature_counter, + attested_credential_data, + extensions: None, + }) + } +} /// > Authenticators may implement various transports for communicating with /// > clients. This enumeration defines hints as to how clients might